Expanding Evolutionary Epistemology

L.W. McCall
Leverhulme Centre for Human Evolutionary Studies, University of Cambridge

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     Last modified: June 15, 2005
     Presentation date: 07/14/2005 2:00 PM in ROZH 107
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Abstract
Dobzhansky’s dictum, “Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution” has inspired a search for evolutionary explanations for everything by default. Although a truism, there is not one but many approaches to how one can go about “making sense” of biological characters.

I will examine here the idea that not everything in epistemology makes sense in light of evolution. So-called evolutionary epistemology is somewhat of a misnomer because cognition is also largely interpretable in terms of the roles played by proximate biological factors such as development and ecology. In other words, human cognition is not only a product of a particular evolutionary history but also responds to a range of patterns of development and life history events and changing roles in the ecological community. Given the multiple potential approaches, the over-reliance on evolutionary explanation and the importance given to the metaphor of “blind variation and selective retention” impede understanding of how both proximate and ultimate causes in biology can inform epistemology.

Of particular interest is whether epistemological products such as discoveries and inventions should be qualified as adaptations. The multiple meanings of adaptation are reviewed in this context. A non-evolutionary meaning of adaptation as adaptability is discussed relating to individual physiological/developmental self-organization in the form of acclimation, cognitive imprinting, conditioning and learning, researched anew by behavioral ecologists under the general rubric of phenotypic plasticity. Although cognition interacts with evolutionary processes in many ways, its dynamics crucially involve the generation and inheritance of “epistemic artefacts” and proximal influences on individual life histories, in the context of norms of reaction within species. It is suggested that if we are to retain the term “evolutionary epistemology” while making the necessary accommodation of alternative biological explanations, then an epigenetic perspective is a pragmatic way to make sense of these new elements in the context of inheritance. The result is a balanced emphasis on cognitive development, ecology, adaptability and evolutionary history, and the encouragement of inquiry into new sources of causation in the dynamics of epistemology.

In summary, it is still an open question whether similarities between epistemological and evolutionary patterns and processes necessarily reveal anything about shared mechanisms. In fact, if epistemology were not already seen as something originating in but ultimately separate from biology, it could never be subjected to evolutionary metaphors. It is critical to the future study of epistemology that it be contextualized accurately, because nothing in cognition makes sense except in light of biology.