Toward an integrative taxonomy of units of explanation

Vivette Garcia-Deister
Philosophy Department UNAM

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     Last modified: February 14, 2005
     Presentation date: 07/14/2005 4:00 PM in MACK 236
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Abstract
Accounts of explanation given in terms of mechanisms, capacities, and processes have become common in the philosophical literature. It is not clear which of these units of explanation, if any, provides the best standpoint from which to view biological phenomena, or even what relationships hold between them. Building on insights from the work of Griesemer and Oyama, I sketch a taxonomy of units of explanation. Ultimately, I argue that although units of explanation sometimes compete, they need not: Oyama and Griesemer both offer compelling accounts of developmental phenomena that integrate two or more of these alternatives.