What are the adaptive functions of guilt and shame, or why aren't we all psychopathic?

Stefan Linquist
Philosophy Department, Duke University

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     Last modified: February 15, 2005
     Presentation date: 07/14/2005 2:00 PM in ROZH 107
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Abstract
In conjunction with our advanced reasoning abilities, humans have evolved a suite of “higher cognitive” emotions that distinguish us from other primates. Perhaps the most mysterious of these are shame and guilt. Why would selection favor emotions that motivate us to forego individual interest, even in cases where our transgressions would go undetected? The Trivers-Frank hypothesis suggests that these emotions evolved to facilitate reciprocal cooperation. Guilt-prone individuals are unlikely to squelch on their promises, it is argued, and provided that this disposition is detectable by others, these individuals will be favored in cooperative ventures. However, I find this story unsatisfying. One problem is that other species of primate successfully reciprocate -chimps exchange meat, capuchins forage collectively- without requiring a sense of guilt or shame to do so. A second worry is that guilt and shame are easily faked. Psychopathic individuals (who lack these emotions) are often successful at convincing parole boards of their “remorse,” for example. A third shortcoming of the Trivers-Frank hypothesis is that it fails to account for certain aspects of the guilt/shame phenotype. For example, these emotions are socially triggered in ways that effectively place us under the control of conspecifics, such as when one is “made to feel guilty” for some action. This propensity for social manipulation is far beyond anything that is required for reciprocal altrusism. So why, then, aren't we all psychopathic? I suggest that this question is best answered from the perspective of multi-level selection theory. Groups composed of guilt-prone individuals must invest fewer resources in detecting and punishing defectors, thereby enjoying a competitive advantage over non-guilt-prone groups. I conclude the paper with some suggestions for how this proposal could be tested against the Trivers/Frank hypothesis.