The Justificatory Role of (Evolved) Moral Intuitions

Fritz Allhoff
Western Michigan University, Department of Philosophy

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     Last modified: June 15, 2005
     Presentation date: 07/14/2005 2:00 PM in ROZH 105
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Abstract
In this paper, I want to discuss the role that intuitions play in moral philosophy, particularly as pertains to serving justificatory roles for moral knowledge. Intuitionism has a long history in ethics, and not a very popular one. Nevertheless, it has been unclear to most people what the alternative to some sort of intuitionism could possibly be. The challenge, as I take it, is to advance some sort of austere intuitionism that is impervious to the traditional challenges (i.e., I intuit P, therefore P is obviously a deductively invalid argument!).

I will assume that at least some of our moral intuitions have evolved by natural selection (pursuant to some plausible evolutionary psychology). This assumption certianly seems plausible to me, though I will attend to the appropriate criticisms. Given this stipulation, I will go on to argue that moral knowledge cannot be founded upon these evolved intutions given various naturalistic fallacies: a descriptive fact about psychologies (i.e., that those psychologies were highly influenced by natural selection) cannot carry any normative weight. Lest we regress to moral skepticism, I will propose that there are at least some moral intuitions that can serve as the basis for moral knowledge, namely those that are unaffected by natural selection (or any other "undermining defeaters").

Multiple Paper Session:
Other papers in this session:
Evolutionary Biology and the Epistemology of Metaphysical Modality
Kissing Cousins: Mental Representation and Biological Mimicry
Sexual Selection and the Evolution of Moral Belief
How Evolutionary is Evolutionary Economics?