(Why) Do the life sciences need natural kinds? – And (how) could they get them?

Thomas Reydon
Center for Philosophy and Ethics of Science, University of Hannover

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     Last modified: June 15, 2005
     Presentation date: 07/14/2005 11:00 AM in ROZH 107
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Abstract
A central aspect of investigation in most scientific disciplines is the classification of the things under study (material entities, phenomena, processes, etc.) into classes over which empirical generalizations can be formulated, that in turn can serve as the bases for the explanation and prediction of particular events or states of affairs. Although establishing the ontological foundations on which scientific classificatory and explanatory practices rest arguably is among the main tasks of philosophy of science, adequate ontological accounts are still lacking for most domains of science. In the life sciences, this is at least in part due to the failure of traditional accounts of natural kinds to apply to most – if not all – kinds that feature in the life sciences as the grounds for empirical generalizations. (The case of species is the prototypical example in this context.) As a result, it is often denied that the life sciences study natural kinds, however without providing an alternative ontological account for the actual epistemic practice in many domains of life science of using kinds as the bases for explanatory and predictive empirical generalizations. In order to account for such epistemic practices, an increasing number of investigators have begun to explore the possibility of a non-traditional, more liberal conception of natural kinds in which natural kinds are primarily understood as generalization-supporting units, whatever their precise ontology turns out to be. So far, however, these explorations have not yet resulted in a general ontology of natural kinds that is applicable to kinds in the life sciences as well as in other domains of science. In this presentation, I argue that the life sciences need such an irreducible notion of natural kinds as generalization-supporting units and explore ways in which such a notion can be filled in ontologically.